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Abstract 
One of the main aim of political economy is to understand how income redistribution is determined. In the paper 
tactical redistribution, through which parties aim at maximizing the share of votes obtained in an election, is analyzed 
in a federal institutional setting, where different levels of government coexist. Dixit and Londregan (1996)'s model is 
taken as a starting point; their model is extended in order to allow the analysis of the interactions between the various 
government levels. Four institutional settings are considered, entailing different rules and a different degree of 
decentralization in the policy and transfer determination process: fully localized and fully centralized governments, 
federal government with transfers among regions and federal government with transfers among social groups.
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1. Introduction
There are at least two forces driving redistribution. On one hand (ideological component)
redistribution among citizens is desirable in order to reach some social objective (e.g.: total welfare
maximization). On the other hand (tactical component) redistribution may serve parties’ objective
of maximizing their share of votes. The ideal recipients of tactical transfers may be either swing
voters (see Dixit and Londregan, 1996)1 or parties’ constituencies (Cox and McCubbins, 1986).2
This paper analyzes tactical transfers in a federal setting, where parties compete to maximize
the share of votes in the elections at a central and at a local level. Four settings will be considered,
entailing a different degree of centralization. Fully localized and fully centralized governments,
with both policy and transfers decided at a local and central level respectively, will be considered as
benchmark cases. In federal governments, policies are the result of a bargaining between local and
centralgovernments. Inafederalgovernmentwithtransfersamongregions, thecentralgovernment
performs transfers among regions, and local governments perform transfers among different social
groups within their regions. In a federal government with transfers among social groups, both the
local and the central governments perform transfers among social groups, the central government
at a national and the local government at a regional level.
Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) model is chosen as a starting point, for two reasons. First, the
evidence available in the literature tends to conﬁrm the prediction of this model as compared to
Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) one (see, among others, Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). Second,
this model is more general and, under special circumstances, may lead to similar conclusions as
Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) one.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the elements of the model; Section 3 ana-
lyzes political equilibria under the different institutional settings; Section 4 concludes.
2. Elements of the model
A country formed by different regions is considered; within each region there are groups of
citizens with different income per capita. Citizens have preferences over the implemented policy
and over their private consumption. A local and a central government level coexist and parties
compete at both levels, using monetary transfers in order to attract votes. In detail, the elements of
the model are as follows.
Two parties, L and R, run an electoral competition and aim at maximizing their share of votes
at a local and at a central level.3 Parties have a ﬁxed political position and, for simplicity, L and
R will denote both the parties and their political platforms. Parties pursue tactical redistribution in
order to maximize the number of votes obtained.
Citizens care about private consumption and have ideological preferences over the different
policies proposed by the parties. As in Dixit and Londregan (1996), voters are considered as a
continuum distributed along the real line: a voter located at point X has an (ideological) preference
1The model is extended by Dixit and Londregan (1998) where citizens and parties also care about income distribu-
tion.
2? analyze the incentives for candidates to creates inequalities among voters. His model, however, considers
homogeneous voters and therefore does not provide useful predictions for the purpose of our analysis.
3The precise objective function of the parties will depend on the institutional setting and will be speciﬁed in detail
in the following section.
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of X for party R over party L. The utility over consumption is increasing and strictly concave (e.g.:
U′(c) > 0,U′′(c) < 0).
The country is formed by F regions denoted by i. Each region has a population Ni, and N is





Citizens belong to G different social groups, denoted by j. Every citizen belonging to group
j has a pre-transfers income of yj. Citizens in each group exhibit heterogeneous ideological po-
sitions, but it is realistic to suppose some kind of “political orientation” (e.g.: the poor may be
more left oriented and the rich more right oriented). This phenomenon is modeled by considering
different distributions of X among different groups. Φj(:), deﬁned over the range of values of X
for citizens of group j, denotes the cumulative frequency distribution (and ϕj(:) the density func-
tion) of voters of group j over this range.4 Therefore Φj(X′) denotes the proportion of voters of
group j with X ≤ X′. Two restrictions will be imposed on the distribution functions. Each density
function ϕj(:) must be single peaked and, for each group, there must be at least one citizen strictly
preferring each of the two parties’ political platform (e.g.: 0 < Φj(0) < 1).
The policy outcome is identiﬁed by a vector P = (P1;P2;:::;PF) representing the policies im-
plemented in each region. Policy outcome and monetary transfers will be determined following
different rules depending on the institutional setting adopted.
3. Political Equilibria
Four different political settings are considered, entailing a different degree of centralization: lo-
calized and centralized governments and federal governments with transfers among social groups
or among regions.
3.1 Equilibrium in a fully localized government
The results obtained in this framework largely reﬂect the results obtained in Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1996). In a fully localized government the game develops as follows.










Nij ≤ Bi, k = L;R, where tk
ij is the transfer proposed by party k to a citizen of region i and group j
and Bi is an exogenous given monetary amount available to the government of region i.
Bi is identical for the two parties, since it represents an amount of resources available for
redistribution in region i, irrespective of which party wins the elections. This assumption is crucial
and will be maintained through all the different institutional settings, as well as it was present in
Dixit and Londregan (1996). The results of the model are not robust to a modiﬁcation of this
assumption.5 Moreover, Bi is not dependent on any social group (j) and may vary only across
4Φj(:) is supposed to be concave. However, for a discussion on the necessity of this assumption, see the Mathe-
matical Appendix in Dixit and Londregan (1996).
5In Dixit and Londregan (1996), the assumption that BL = BR is crucial in order to obtain the result that the La-
grange multipliers related to the maximization problem faced by the two parties are the same (λL =λR). Since through
the maximization problem the Langrange multipliers are the only party-speciﬁc information, an equal Lagrange mul-
tiplier for both parties implies that the same strategy represents an optimal solution for L and R (so that the transfer
2
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regions, since it is available to each party that will win the elections irrespective of the social
groups that will beneﬁt from the tactical transfers. Also this assumption is crucial in order to
obtain the equilibrium results, and will be maintained through the various settings.6
The consumption enjoyed by a citizen of region i and group j is cij = yj+tij.
Denoting Vk
i as the share of votes obtained in region i by party k, the policy implemented in
region i is L iff VL
i ≥ VR
i , otherwise the policy implemented is R. Similarly, the transfers imple-





Therefore, a political equilibrium for region i in a fully localized setting is characterized by
two sets of transfers tk
i = (tk
ij;:::;tk
ij), k = L;R and a set of voting decisions by citizens such that,
in stage 1, tL
i (tR
i ) maximizes party L (R) shares of votes in region i given tR
i (tL
i ) and, in stage
2, every citizen Z votes for party L iff UZ(L) ≥ UZ(R) (and for party R otherwise). Each party
chooses a transfer proposal that maximizes its own share of votes (tactical redistribution) and each
citizen casts his vote for the preferred party (considering both ideological position and transfer
proposals).7
In order to ﬁnd a closed form equilibrium the following speciﬁcation of the utility function,
as in Dixit and Londregan (1996), will be assumed: Uij(cij) = kj ×
c1−ε
ij
1−ε . kj is a group speciﬁc
parameter on the relative importance of consumption with respect to ideology. This speciﬁcation
will be maintained through the rest of the paper. We look for subgame perfect equilibria. We will
limit the analysis to interior equilibria (for a discussion on the reasonableness of this approach
and on the conditions for excluding corner solution, see the Mathematical Appendix in Dixit and
Londregan, 1996).
Proposition 1. In a fully localized government there exists a unique SPE in which:







Bi)−yj, where ϕj(0) is the density of group j at X = 0 and Yi = ∑jNij ×yj represents the total
income of region i citizens;
(2) All citizens positioned on the real line of ideological positions at a point X ≤ 0 vote for
party L, all citizens positioned at X > 0 vote for R.
Proof: see Dixit and Londregan (1996).






×(Yi+Bi) and groups with higher k and higher ϕj(0) obtain better results in the
schedules proposed are the same in equilibrium). Clearly, this result does not hold if λL ̸= λR (e.g. if from the ini-
tial case in which BL = BR we raise either BL or BR, then the two Lagrange multipliers will not be equal between
them and parties’ strategies will diverge). For further details concerning the derivation of the SPE equilibria see the
Mathematical Appendix in Dixit and Londregan (1996).
6If Bi had been different depending on the social group receiving the monetary transfer, the maximization problem
would have been more complicated, since parties would have faced a different budget constraint for each social group.
The proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness as it is presented in Dixit and Londregan (1996) would not hold in
such a modiﬁed setting.
7The assumptions that, when indifferent, a citizen chooses L and that, in case of VL = VR, the policy and the
transfer proposal of party L are implemented will not have any effect on equilibrium implications.
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redistribution game.
3.2 Equilibrium in a fully centralized government
In a fully centralized government only the national electoral campaign and the national elec-
tions matter and the game develops as follows: in stage 1 the national electoral campaign takes
place and each party proposes a transfer schedule among different social groups; in stage 2 the
national elections take place; in stage 3 the policy and transfer schedule of the winning party are
implemented.
In particular, during the national electoral campaign (stage 1) parties propose two transfer




G ), k = L;R where t
N;k
j represents the transfer proposal of party k towards













in region i is L iff VL
N ≥VR






Similarly to the local government case, a political equilibrium for region i in a fully centralized






i ), k = L;R and a set of voting




i ) maximizes party L (R) shares of votes in




i ) and, in stage 2, every citizen Z votes for party L iff UZ(L) ≥UZ(R) (and
for party R otherwise).
Proposition 2. In a fully centralized government there exists a unique SPE, in which:











} ×(Y +B)−yj ,
where ϕj(0) is the density of group j at X = 0 and Y = ∑i∑jNij ×yj represents the total income
of the country;
(2) All citizens positioned on the real line of ideological positions at a point X ≤ 0 vote for
party L, all citizens positioned at X > 0 vote for R.
Proof: the proof is similar to the case of fully localized government, it is sufﬁcient to consider
the whole nation as a unique region.
As in the case of completely centralized government groups with an higher k and ϕj(0) perform
better in the redistribution game.
3.3 Equilibria in federal governments
In federal governments, policies are the result of a bargaining between local and central gov-
ernments. In a federal government with transfers among regions, the central government performs
transfers among regions, and local governments perform transfers among different social groups
within their regions.9 In a federal government with transfers among social groups both the local
8In order to maintain consistency with the previous section assume B = ∑iBi.
9This model might stylize the E.U. context in which, at a federation level, there is a certain degree of redistribution
4
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and the central governments perform transfers among groups of citizens, the central government
at a national and the local government at a regional level.10 In order to maintain the analysis
tractable, the discussion will be limited, from now on, to the case in which two regions and two
income groups exist.
In particular, in a federal government with transfers among regions, the game develops as
follows: in stage 1 the national electoral campaign takes place and parties propose an inter-regional
transfer schedule; in stage 2 national elections are held; in stage 3, the local electoral campaign
takes place and parties propose transfers among different social groups at a regional level; in stage
4 local elections are held; in stage 5 policies and transfers are implemented according with the
rules that will be described below.









Mi ≤ 0 . The inter-regional transfer vector implemented is ML iffVL
N ≥VR
N
in the national elections (MR otherwise).
During the local electoral campaign (stage 3) parties in region i propose a vector of transfers
tk





ij ≤ Bi+Mi, where
tk
ij is the transfer proposed by party k to a citizen of region i and group j and Bi is an exogenous
given amount available to government of region i for transfers.11 The intra-regional implemented






of the party governing at a central and at a local level, Pi = γ ·PCen+(1−γ)·PLoc
i .
Partiesaimatmaximizingaweightedaverageoftheshareofvotesinthetwolevelsofelections.










µi = 1. φ is
the weight given to the national elections, µi is the weight given to the local election in region i,
Vk
Nand Vk
i are the shares of votes obtained by party k in the national and in region i local election,
respectively.
A political equilibrium in a federal government with transfers among regions is characterized
by two proposed sets (one for each party) of inter-regional transfers Mk = (Mk
1;;Mk
2), two sets (for
each region) of intra-regional transfers tk
i = (tk
i1;tk
i2), k = L;R and two sets of voting decision by
citizens (both in the central both in the local elections) such that: in stage 3 (local electoral cam-
paign), in each region, tL
i (tR
i ) maximizes party L (R) objective function value given tR(tL), MRand
ML; in stage 1 (national electoral campaign), ML (MR) maximizes party L (R) objective function
given MR (ML) and assuming agents’ rational behavior in the following stages of the game; in
stage 2 (national elections) and in stage 4 (local elections) every citizen Z votes for party L iff
among different member states while each country implements redistribution policies among the different groups of
citizens.
10In the U.S. both at a federal and at a national level there are policy programs that entail a certain degree of
redistribution among social groups.
11Note that, in fact, the real amount of resources available to the regional government for transfers include Mi, the
transfer operated by the central government towards region i.
5
2103Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2098-2108
UZ(L) ≥UZ(R), vice versa votes for party R.
On the other side, in a federal government with transfers among social groups the game devel-
ops as follows: in stage 1 the national electoral campaign takes place and parties propose transfer
schedules among different social groups at a central level; in stage 2 national elections are held;
in stage 3, the local electoral campaign takes place and in each region parties propose transfer
schedules among different social groups at a local level; in stage 4 local elections are held; in stage
5 policy and transfers are implemented in accordance with the rules that will be described below.
Transfers at a national level will be denoted with tN and transfers at a local level with t.














j ≤ 0 ; k = L;R, where t
N;k
j is the
transfer proposed by party k to all the citizens of the country belonging to group j. The trans-
fers implemented by the central government are tN;L iff VL
N ≥ VR
N in the national elections (tN;R
otherwise).















j , k=L;R, where
tk
ij is the transfer proposed by party k to a citizen of region i and group j and Bi is an exogenous
given amount available to government of region i for transfers.12
The policy implemented in each region i is determined according to the same rules as in the
case of a federal government with transfers among regions; parties’ objective functions are, as
well, the same as in the previous setting.
A political equilibrium in a federal government with transfers among social groups is char-




2 ), two sets (for
each region) of intra regional transfers tk
i = (tk
i1;tk
i2), k = L;R and two sets of voting decision by
citizens (both in the central both in the local elections) such that: in stage 3 (local electoral cam-
paign), in each region, tL
i (tR
i ) maximizes party L (R) objective function value giventR
i (tL
i ), tN;Land
tN;R; in stage 1 (national electoral campaign) tN;L (tN;L) maximizes party L (R) objective function
given tN;R (tN;L) and assuming agents’ rational behavior in the following stages of the game; in
stage 2 (national elections) and in stage 4 (local elections) every citizen Z votes for party L iff
UZ(L) ≥UZ(R), vice versa votes for party R.
Proposition 3. In federal governments with transfers among regions and social groups there
exists a SPE, in which:











} ×(Y +B)−yj (1)







the sum of the transfers operated by the central government towards citizens of region i.
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whereTij istheﬁnalmonetarytransfer(includingtransfersfromlocalandcentralgovernment),
ϕj(0) is the density of group j at X = 0 , Y = ∑i∑jNij ×yj represents the total income of the
country and B = ∑iBi;
(2) All citizens positioned on the real line of ideological positions at a point X ≤ 0 vote for
party L, all citizens positioned at X > 0 vote for R both in the elections for the central government
and in the elections for the local one.
Proof: see Appendix I.
4. Discussion of the results and ﬁnal remarks
The paper analyzed a model in which, in a federal country, redistribution may occur at different
levels and towards different social groups or regions. Local and central governments interact in
order to determine the implemented policy and the transfer schedule, parties compete in order to
maximize their share of votes in local and central elections and citizens vote so to maximize their
utility, given by consumption possibilities and implemented policies. In this basic model an equiv-
alence result was obtained: for what concerns the distributional effects, the equilibria obtained in
a context of centralized government and in a context of federal government with transfers (among
regions or among social groups) are equivalent. That is: within these equilibria, given the same
initial global endowment of resources, the transfer schedules implemented are the same.
Three assumption were basic in the derivation of this result. First, the timing of the game is
crucial. Given that the national electoral campaign precedes local ones, candidates to the central
government have a higher commitment ability and can correctly anticipate the behavior of parties
and citizens in the local electoral cycle. Since it is impossible for the winner of the national
elections to inﬂuence local electoral results, the optimal behavior for candidates to the central
government is to choose transfers so to maximize the total share obtained in the national elections
(e.g.: the same as in the centralized government). Second, parties have the same redistributive
abilities and differ only in their political position so that, in equilibrium, both parties propose the
same set of transfers. Third, given the structure of citizens’ political preferences and given that, in
equilibrium, candidates propose the same set of transfers in both electoral cycles, sincere voting
will always be optimal. This is due to the fact that, if equilibrium transfers are the same, everyone
will vote for the preferred party in term of proposed policy platform.13
Comparing the equilibria obtained in the case of localized government two settings (local-
ized and centralized) we observe that a citizen of region i and group j obtain higher consumption
opportunities in a context of localization, with respect to centralization and federal government















Citizens living in high income regions tend to prefer, ceteris paribus, localization over cen-




Nij[kj ×ϕj(0)]1=ε tend to
13If the preferences were speciﬁed also over linear combinations of the two policies, a balancing effect (similar to
divided government effect pointed out in ?) between central and local elections would have emerged, with someone
voting strategically in the local election in order to promote a policy platform intermediate between L’s and R’s ones.
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prefer centralization since regions with a greater "average" reactivity and with more swing voters
are more attractive and are ideal recipients of tactical transfers. This is realistic and consistent with
what commonly observed: poorer regions and “swing” regions tend to prefer more centralization
while richer regions tend to push towards a more decentralized institutional arrangements.
At least three steps may lead to further interesting research. First, the introduction of asymme-
tries in the parties’ ability to deliver transfers towards different social groups or different regions
may lead to some kind of core support result, with different redistribution implications depend-
ing on the institutional setting adopted. Second, the theoretical model may be expanded so to
include more developed mechanism of electoral campaign and policy determination rules. Finally,
empirical analysis will permit to test the main theoretical results and allow to compare the main
predictions of the literature on tactical transfers in a federal institutional setting.
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Appendix I - Proof of proposition III
Federal government with transfers among regions
Solving backward, in stage 4 a voter of region i and group j, with ideological position X, votes
for party L iffUj(cL
ij)−Uj(cR
ij) ≥ (1−γ)×X.
We can determine the cutoff point for citizens of region i and group j, such that all citizens





During the local electoral campaign (stage 3) parties propose a set of (tactical) transfers so to
maximize the share of votes in local election.

















where Mi is the amount of transfers received by region i by central government and Bi is an
exogenous given monetary amount available to the government of region i.
Party R problem is symmetric to party L one.
The context is similar to the one solved in the case of a fully localized government, except for
the fact that the total sum available for transfers among citizens of region i is Bi+Mi. Therefore,
following the same steps, it is possible to derive the optimal transfers and the ﬁnal consumption
schedule of a citizens living in region i and belonging to social group j. The consumption schedule,






×(Y +Bi +Mi), where Miis the transfer received by
region i by the central government.
It is now possible to proceed with the analysis of the national electoral cycle (stage 1 and stage
2).




In stage 1 (national electoral campaign), parties aim at maximizing the nation wide share of





































NijYj−Bi, where Y represents the income of all the citizens of the country.
This result, together with the equilibrium consumption derived in stage 3, proves the proposi-
tion.
Federal government with transfers among social groups
Solving backward, in stage 4 (local elections) a voter of region i and group j, with ideological
position X, votes for party L iffUj(cL
ij)−Uj(cR
ij) ≥ (1−γ)×X.
We can determine the cutoff point for citizens of region i and group j, such that all citizens to





In the local electoral campaign (stage 3) parties propose a set of (tactical) transfers so to maxi-
mize the share of votes in the local election.
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Party R solves a similar maximization problem.
The problem is similar to the one solved in the case of fully localized government, except that




j is the transfer
performed by central government towards citizens of group j. Therefore, following the same steps,
it is possible to derive the optimal transfers and the ﬁnal consumption schedule of a citizen living













Proceeding with the analysis of the national electoral cycle (stage 1 and stage 2), the cutoff





In stage 1 (national electoral campaign, parties aim at maximizing the nation wide share of














































The solution of this maximization problem leads to the result. Since it involves some long
algebraic steps we do not summarize it here, but it is available upon request.
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